The Islamabad Accords: Framework, Preparations, and the Long View

The ceasefire between the United States and Iran enters its third day on April 11, when formal talks begin in Islamabad. What started as a two-week pause in hostilities is now a test of whether temporary restraint can become a permanent resolution.

Image credit: AFP

The Islamabad accords negotiations represent more than a bilateral meeting. They are a proving ground for a new model of conflict mediation, one where traditional Western capitals no longer hold a monopoly on the diplomatic track. Pakistan, a nuclear-armed state with ties to both Washington and Tehran, has positioned itself as the indispensable intermediary. Whether that position holds will depend on what happens in the coming days.

The Prelude: How the Table Was Set

By early April, the Iran-US war had already inflicted thousands of casualties, infrastructure damage, and triggered the largest oil supply disruption in history, with the Strait of Hormuz operating at less than ten percent of normal capacity. Hundreds of tankers remained trapped inside the Gulf. Global energy markets were in crisis.

Pakistan entered the gap gradually. According to reports, Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif conducted overnight shuttle diplomacy between Washington and Tehran, carrying proposals and counterproposals across a divide that conventional mediators had failed to bridge. A US fifteen-point plan was reduced to an Iranian ten-point counteroffer. That document, whatever its precise contents, became the basis for the current ceasefire.

On April 8, Trump announced a two-week suspension of hostilities, crediting Pakistan's intervention directly. "Based on conversations with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal Asim Munir of Pakistan," he said, "I agree to suspend the bombing and attack of Iran for a period of two weeks". This was on the primary condition of the immediate, complete, and safe reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran accepted hours later. Sharif then announced that the ceasefire applied "everywhere, including Lebanon, "a claim immediately contested by the United States and Israel. That contradiction remains unresolved and will likely shadow the Islamabad accords.

The Preparations: Security and Logistics

Islamabad has been transformed over the past forty-eight hours. The scale of preparation reflects the stakes of the visit.

When Vice President JD Vance lands in Pakistan, his motorcade will include heavily armored Chevrolet Suburbans, a specialized ambulance and support truck, electronic countermeasure vehicles to neutralize explosive threats, and multiple SUVs and vans for advisors and staff. Rear tail vehicles will provide additional protection. The total convoy is expected to include between forty and one hundred vehicles. This is standard protocol for a U.S. vice president regardless of destination; the security apparatus travels with the official, not as a reflection of local conditions but as a matter of consistent procedure.

Preparations have been underway since a C-17 transport aircraft landed earlier this week, carrying advanced security and communications equipment. Vance is highly likely to stay at the US Consulate to minimize vulnerability and maintain secure communications.

On the Iranian side, a Mahan Air flight arrived on the morning of April 10, carrying the advance team for Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. Iranian security personnel were observed coordinating with Pakistani officials at the airport.

The host government has taken parallel measures. Local holidays have been announced. Schools and colleges are closed, though the FBISE examinations will continue under special arrangements. Heavy vehicles have been restricted from entering the capital. Several public hiking trails have been shut down. The Serena Hotel has been cleared of regular guests to accommodate delegation staff and support personnel.

Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi confirmed that a "comprehensive and foolproof" security plan has been finalized for the visiting officials. During a meeting with US Ambassador Natalie Baker, Naqvi assured that Vance, along with Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, would be received as special guests. The Islamabad accords will be held at a military site under Pakistan Army charge, with a mix of direct and indirect contacts between the delegations.

The Framework: Who Is Talking and What They Want

The diplomatic traffic into Islamabad has been steady since April 9. Other international observers have arrived as well. A team from the United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs is present in an informal capacity, available for technical advice if requested by either party. Gulf diplomats have also traveled to Islamabad but are not expected to participate directly.

The US delegation is led by Vice President JD Vance, a notable choice given his reported reservations about the war from its early stages. He is joined by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, both of whom have served as Trump's envoys on Middle East files. The White House announced the delegation on Wednesday, with Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt confirming that Islamabad accords would begin Saturday morning.

Iran's delegation includes Foreign Minister Araghchi, Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf, and four senior commanders from Iran's Revolutionary Guard, according to Pakistani government sources. The inclusion of Guard commanders signals that security arrangements, particularly regarding the Strait of Hormuz, will be central to the discussions. Araghchi, who previously served as Iran's lead nuclear negotiator under the original JCPOA, is expected to handle the core political discussions, while Ghalibaf, a former Guard commander himself, brings military credibility and direct access to the Guard's leadership.

The structure of the Islamabad accords remains flexible. Pakistani sources have indicated no fixed timeframe; negotiations could extend beyond a single day and may continue for two to three days depending on progress. The format will include both direct face-to-face sessions and indirect contacts mediated by the Pakistani hosts. This dual-track approach allows for breakthroughs when direct engagement is productive and cooling-off periods when it is not.

Iran's ten-point proposal is widely understood to include demands for sanctions relief, restoration of frozen assets, recognition of the right to enrich uranium, and a ceasefire that explicitly covers Lebanon. The United States has acknowledged receipt of a proposal but has not confirmed that the version published in Iranian media matches the document that Washington agreed to discuss. This discrepancy, whether tactical or substantive, will need resolution at the table.

The Fracture over Lebanon

No issue threatens the talks more directly than Lebanon. Sharif's announcement that the ceasefire applied everywhere, including Lebanon, was immediately contradicted by both Washington and Tel Aviv. Vance described the disagreement as a "legitimate misunderstanding" but made clear that the United States never agreed to include Lebanon in the pause. Netanyahu's office went further, stating flatly that the ceasefire "does not include Lebanon" and that Israel would continue its campaign against Hezbollah.

Iran sees the matter differently. Ghalibaf has accused the United States of violating three provisions of the ten-point proposal, including the understanding that Lebanon would be covered. President Pezeshkian has stated that continued Israeli strikes on Lebanon render the talks "meaningless". For Tehran, Hezbollah is not a separate front but an integral part of the regional deterrent structure. A ceasefire that protects Iran but abandons its most powerful ally is no ceasefire at all.

The violence on the ground has only deepened the contradiction. On Wednesday alone, Israeli strikes on Lebanon killed at least 203 people and wounded more than 1,000. Hezbollah has responded with rocket fire and ground engagements in southern Lebanon. The humanitarian toll continues to rise, with over 1,700 killed in Lebanon since the escalation began.

Yet there is a development that offers a slender thread of hope. In a significant shift, Netanyahu has ordered his ministers to begin direct negotiations with Lebanon, focused on disarming Hezbollah and establishing peaceful relations. The Lebanese government has indicated it wants a ceasefire declared before starting any talks, but the mere fact of an announced negotiation represents a departure from Israel's previous refusal to engage.

This move could complement the Islamabad accords rather than contradict it. If Israel and Lebanon reach a separate understanding, or even agree to a parallel ceasefire, Iran may find it easier to accept a narrow US-Iran agreement. The reverse is also true: if Israeli strikes continue unabated during the Islamabad talks, Iran could walk away.

The Long-Term Picture

Assuming the talks do not collapse immediately, what might a successful outcome look like? Three scenarios are possible.

The narrowest success would be an extension of the current pause beyond two weeks, coupled with a conditional reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. This would not resolve the nuclear question or settle the Lebanon front, but it would buy time. Given the complexity of the issues and the depth of distrust, time itself may be the most valuable commodity in the room.

A more ambitious outcome would involve a written framework agreement addressing the Strait, sanctions, and enrichment in phased terms. Iran might accept limits on enrichment in exchange for measured relief. The United States might accept a permanent ceasefire in exchange for verifiable guarantees on Hormuz. Lebanon would remain a separate track, but the Israeli-Lebanese negotiations announced by Netanyahu could run parallel to the Islamabad process.

The most ambitious and least likely scenario would be a comprehensive settlement that includes all fronts. This would require Israel to halt its Lebanon campaign, Iran to accept verified limits on its nuclear program, and the United States to deliver substantial sanctions relief and reparations. The gaps on all three issues remain wide.

The Epilogue: What Comes After Islamabad Accords

No one expects the Islamabad accords to produce a final peace treaty. The issues are too entrenched, the parties too suspicious, the regional landscape too volatile. But a partial agreement, one that keeps the strait open, extends the ceasefire, and establishes a mechanism for further negotiation would represent more than anyone has achieved in months.

The old mediation hubs have tried and failed. Geneva, Brussels, and other traditional capitals could not bridge the divide. Pakistan has done what they could not, not because it is more neutral but because it is more credible. It shares a border with Iran, maintains a functional security relationship with Washington, and has not spent decades accumulating the kind of institutional baggage that makes trust impossible.

Whether this credibility survives the talks depends on two factors. The first is whether the United States and Iran can compartmentalize Lebanon, either by resolving it separately or by agreeing to disagree without walking away. The second is whether Israel's announced negotiations with Lebanon produce any tangible de-escalation. If they do, the Islamabad process may succeed. If they do not, the ceasefire may become another casualty of a wider war.